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‘The European Union is first and foremost a Union of values and of the rule of law. The
conquest of these values is the result of our history. They are the hard core of the Union’s
identity and enable every citizen to identify with it. The Commission is convinced that in this
Union of values it will not be necessary to apply penalties pursuant to Article 7 of the Union
Treaty’
European Commission, 15 October 2003
1. What has just happened?
On Wednesday, the European Commission reacted to the continuing deterioration of the
rule of law situation in Poland by (i) issuing a fourth Rule of Law Recommendation, which
complements three previous Recommendations, adopted on 27 July 2016, 21 December
2016 and 27 July 2017; (ii) submitting a Reasoned Proposal for a Decision of the Council
on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach of the rule of law by Poland under
Article 7(1) TEU and (iii) referring the Polish Law on the Ordinary Courts Organisation to
the Court of Justice of the EU under Article 258 TFEU and in the context of which the
Commission is raising for the first time (to the best of our knowledge) a violation of Article
19(1) TEU in combination with Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights by
Poland to the extent that the Minister of Justice has been given a discretionary power to
prolong the mandate of judges which have reached retirement age (a similar combination
was raised in the first stage of an infringement action against Hungary in December 2015
with regard to immigration issues but this language was dropped by the time it got to the
Court of Justice).
Should the Polish authorities finally decide to implement the Commission’s
recommendations within three months, the Commission has indicated its readiness to
‘reconsider’ its Article 7(1) proposal (para 50 of the Commission’s fourth rule of law
recommendation).
The intensity and repeated nature of Poland’s ruling party attacks on the most basic tenets
of the rule of law are unprecedentedly aggressive and in obvious breach of the Polish
Constitution, which in our view warrants the Commission’s action (this is not to say that
Article 7(1) should not also be activated against Hungary as two of the present authors
previously argued in this 2016 article). Indeed, as rightly noted by the Commission, the
Polish authorities have adopted over a period of two years no less ‘than 13 laws affecting
the entire structure of the justice system in Poland, impacting the Constitutional Tribunal,
Supreme Court, ordinary courts, National Council for the Judiciary, prosecution service and
National School of Judiciary’. It was time therefore for the Commission to defend the
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independence of Member State judiciaries and the rule of law (as nicely put by Maximilian
Steinbeis, ‘polish courts are our courts’, that is, ‘if the legal system in a Member State is
broken, the legal system in the whole of the EU is broken’).
The media have so far only almost exclusively focused on the first ever invocation of what
is often described as the EU’s ‘nuclear option’, which, however, as correctly pointed out by
Frans Timmermans in his press conference announcing the Commission’s actions, is a
misnomer (as we previously argued here). To put it briefly, Article 7 TEU provides for two
main mechanisms: a preventive one in case of a ‘clear risk of a serious breach’ of the
values common to the EU and its Member States and a sanctioning one where ‘a serious
and persistent breach’ of the same values has materialised (for more detailed
commentaries on the mechanics of Article 7 see here and here).
The Commission merely initiated the preventive mechanism on Wednesday when one
could however reasonably argue that we are already way beyond the stage of a ‘clear risk’
and entered ‘serious and persistent breach’ territory following the capture of the Polish
Constitutional Tribunal in obvious breach both of the Polish Constitution and the
Commission’s first and second rule of law recommendations (see Pech and Scheppele,
January 2017). Before however offering further details on the situation in Poland, however,
it may be worth offering a brief overview of Article 7’s genesis.
2. Genesis of Article 7
On 9 May 1950, the venerable Schuman Declaration invited all the free European states to
join the unification project, implying respect for the rule of law, a democratic system of
government, and a market economy. The initial versions of the Treaties presumed
compliance of the Member States with these principles, now reflected in Article 2 TEU. The
enforcement of compliance was nevertheless strictly confined to the scope of the law of the
EU via what are now Articles 258 and 259 TFEU, later reinforced by Article 260 TFEU, thus
leaving compliance with the EU’s foundational values almost exclusively to the care of the
constitutional systems of the Member States. The first shift towards a more active role to be
played by the EU in this respect happened in 1978 when the Commission contemplated a
proposal for a possible sanctions mechanism against the backdrop of the then upcoming
Greek accession. A few years later, the European Parliament draft EU Treaty from 1984
contained such a mechanism for the first time. Later on, the EU began systematically
including ‘human rights clauses’ in all association and cooperation (‘Europe-’) agreements
with the Central and Eastern European states and incorporated these into the fabric of the
pre-accession political conditionality in the areas of democracy, the rule of law and human
rights.
In anticipation of the forthcoming accession of numerous countries to the EU, the Treaty of
Amsterdam included the first version of Article 7 which only provided then for possible
sanctions in a situation of ‘serious and persistent breach’. With the Nice Treaty, Article 7
TEU was revised to further enable the EU to adopt preventive sanctions in the situation
where there is ‘a clear risk of a serious breach’ of the EU values by a Member State. This
change was made to enable the EU to step in in a situation similar to the one in Austria
following the formation of a governmental coalition involving Jörg Haider’s far-right
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Freedom party. Before the Nice amendment, EU’s involvement with Austria took the form of
a series of illegal ad hoc ‘bilateral sanctions’ imposed on Austria by 14 other Member
States acting, strictly speaking, outside of the framework of EU law. These diplomatic
sanctions were ended when the report issued by a “wise men” committee, which was set up
to investigate the political and human rights situation in Austria, concluded that Austria’s
record and commitment to common European values, including the rights of minorities,
refugees and immigrants, was at the time of the report satisfactory: the illegal sanctions
triggered by the election result would thus clearly not be justified under the amended Article
7 either. One might note in this respect how times have changed when the Freedom Party’s
inclusion in a coalition government in Austria last week passed almost totally unremarked
this time. It is wise however for the EU not to overreact to election results to instead react
to actual breaches of the values common to the EU and its Member States.
In the light of this episode and other factors explored in this blog post published in January
2015, the European Commission thought it useful to adopt a pre-Article 7 procedure in
2014 to address systemic threats to the rule of law in any of the EU’s 28 Member States in
response to the EU-28 governments’ express request in 2013 that the Commission should
‘take forward the debate in line with the Treaties on the possible need for and shape of a
collaborative and systematic method to tackle’ rule of law backsliding (this is why it beggars
belief that some EU national governments are now complaining that the Commission is
finally taking this existential issue seriously).
The new pre-Article 7 procedure was activated for the very first time in January 2016
following the non-respect by Polish authorities of crucially important rulings of the Polish
Constitutional Court and the adoption of new rules with respect to Public Service
Broadcasters. As we predicted in this January 2015 post, any soft dialogue with authorities
bent on undermining if not completely dismantling all checks and balances was bound to
fail, and this is indeed what has happened with respect to Poland. It was also bound to
create more space within which the determined autocrats in the Polish governing party
would have more time to consolidate their unchecked power in relative peace. Be that as it
may, having at last accepted the totally fruitless nature of the so-called constructive
dialogue with Polish authorities, the European Commission finally decided, ‘with a heavy
heart’, to activate Article 7(1).
3. Is the Commission’s decision to initiate Article 7 justified?
First, we agree fully with Frans Timmermans when he said earlier this week that the
‘common pattern’ of all the legislative changes targeting the judiciary in Poland ‘is that the
executive or legislative powers are now set up in such a way that the ruling majority can
systematically, politically interfere with the composition, the powers, the administration and
the functioning of these authorities, thereby rendering the independence of the judiciary
completely moot.’ We also share the view recently expressed by Vĕra Jourová and
according to which ‘if one national system of judiciary is broken, the EU system is broken’.
A full account of the measures taken to remove checks and balances would take more
space than we have here, so we can only but give a flavour of the so-called ‘reforms’
devised by Poland’s ruling party and which have been repetitively and publicly criticised (a
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point which the Polish government tends to conveniently forget). It is not just the European
Commission that has repeatedly criticised the Polish reforms, but also the European
Parliament, key bodies of the Council of Europe such as the Venice Commission, the
United Nations Human Rights Committee, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights as well as representatives of the judiciary across Europe, including the
Network of Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the European Union and the
European Network of Councils for the Judiciary. Numerous civil society organisations such
as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have also expressed concerns and
tens of thousands of Poles have taken to the street to protest the attacks on their own
judiciary.
In light of yesterday’s visit to Poland by the British Prime Minister and her failure to publicly
and unambiguously criticise the country’s ongoing descent into authoritarianism  (when
asked about the Commission’s activation of Article 7(1) Theresa May said: ‘These
constitutional issues are normally, and should be primarily a matter for the individual
country concerned’), it is may also be worth recalling that a number of UK bodies have also
expressed their strong concerns regarding the situation in Poland. For instance, last July,
the Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales called on ‘the Polish President,
government and parliament to reject these draft laws and to withdraw and repeal all the
measures which pose such a grave threat to judicial independence and the rule of law in
Poland’. Previously, the body which represents independent judges in England and Wales
expressed issued a press release to make clear its concerns ‘about the reported situation
in Poland and any impact on judicial independence’.
Last but not least, let us not forget the recent and significant intervention of the Court of
Justice in the Białowieża Forest infringement case in the context of which the Court
decided that Poland should be subject to a penalty payment of at least €100,000 per day
should it be found to have violated the Court’s order. They did so because Polish
authorities’ declared that they would ignore a previous order adopted by the Vice-President
of the Court to that effect. This was another factor which led the European Parliament to
adopt a resolution on 15 November 2017 in which the Parliament describes the current rule
of law situation in Poland as representing ‘a clear risk of a serious breach of the values
referred to in Article 2 of the TEU’ and in which the Parliament also rightly deplored ‘the
Polish Government’s refusal to implement the order of the Court of Justice of the EU on
logging in the Białowieża forest’.
The European Commission therefore is hardly alone in its criticism of the Polish ruling
party’s repeated attacks on the rule of law notwithstanding the Polish government’s
ridiculous claim repeated ad nauseam that these attacks are politically motivated.
Three examples may also suffice to demonstrate that what the Polish ruling party calls
‘reforms’ are nothing but a set of unconstitutional and autocratic changes which aim to
completely subjugate the judiciary to the will of the ruling party under the guise of the ‘will of
the people’, no matter how plainly incompatible these changes are with both the Polish
Constitution and Poland’s international obligations.
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Frans Timmermans was entirely correct to point out that the constitutionality of legislation
in Poland is longer guaranteed following the successful but unconstitutional capture of the
Polish Constitutional Tribunal via the unlawful appointment of ideologically compatible
‘judges’ and the rushed installation, specifically in violation of a request from the
Commission, of a new president of the Polish Constitutional Court in December 2016 (for
further analysis see the 2017 posts by Pech and Scheppele: Part I; Part II; Part III). The
situation is now so out of control that crucial rulings of the Constitutional Court that were
made before it was captured ‘have been removed from the register of the Tribunal which is
accessible from its website’ while ‘other judgements which were not yet published at the
time of the adoption of the Recommendation of 21 December 2016 have by contrast been
published on 29 December 2016 in the Journal of Laws’ (see para 5 of Commission
Recommendation 2017/1520 of 26 July 2017). We are here in Orwellian and
unprecedented territory for a country belonging to the EU and space precludes any analysis
of the also unprecedented use (again to the best of our knowledge) of criminal law
provisions designed to protect State institutions by the unlawfully appointed President of
the Polish Constitutional Tribunal to silence her critics (see analysis here).
Secondly, Polish authorities never shy away from describing their ongoing destruction of
the Polish judiciary as being in line with European standards or, failing that, as a pure
matter of national sovereignty: two ludicrous points as explained here in a study co-
authored by Professors Pech and Platon. Let’s take for instance the forthcoming ‘reform’ of
the Supreme Court. It is nothing less than a total purge of its current membership which
should take two to three years to be completed. As noted by the Commission, by lowering
the retirement age and applying it to current Supreme Court judges, the Polish ruling aims
to compulsory retire right away ‘almost 40% of the current Supreme Court judges’ with the
additional discretionary power given to the President of the Republic ‘to prolong the
mandate of Supreme Court judges’ with all new Supreme Court judges to be appointed ‘by
the President on the recommendation of the newly composed National Council for the
Judiciary, which will be largely dominated by political appointees’. One should note in
passing that the Minister of Justice, on the basis of another set of provisions, has already
gained the power ‘to appoint and dismiss all presidents of courts without concrete criteria,
no obligation to state reasons and no judicial review’… This will prove no doubt useful at
the time of the next parliamentary elections as the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the
validation of election results (the Polish ruling party has already begun the process of
amending electoral rules with no doubt the aim to make sure it will not be in a position to
lose them ever again, and a process which no doubt they will try to defend as another
necessary ‘reform’…).
To make matters even worse, the new process of ‘extraordinary review’ of final judgments
laid down in the Act on the Supreme Court, which the Venice Commission described as
having a lot of similarities with the ‘old Soviet system’ and as jeopardising the ‘stability of
the Polish legal order’ in its most recent Opinion on Poland. Indeed, again as noted by the
Venice Commission, under this new process, ‘it it will be possible to reopen any case
decided in the country in the past 20 years, on virtually any ground. Moreover, in the
proposed system the new judgements, adopted after the re-opening, will also be
susceptible to the extraordinary review. It means that no judgment in the Polish system will
ever be “final” anymore’ (para 58). This is as breath-taking as it is unprecedented for a
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country belonging to the EU and in this respect we also share the Venice Commission’s
finding that some aspects of the Polish judicial ‘reform’ targeting its Supreme Court ‘have a
striking resemblance with the institutions which existed in the Soviet Union and its satellites’
(para 89).
Viewed in this light one may be forgiven for thinking that the European Commission should
have moved right away to the sanctioning branch of Article 7 TEU by initiating Article 7(2)
rather than Article 7(1). With its neo-Soviet approach to the division of powers, Poland is
already closer to Belarus in the structure of its institutions than it is to any other European
state. But, as the best is sometimes the enemy of the good, we can understand why the
European Commission would prefer to proceed with the preventive arm of Article 7 first.
Indeed, going straight to the European Council would mean having to secure a unanimous
determination regarding ‘the existence of a serious and persistent breach’ in Poland before
the eventual suspension of ‘certain of the rights deriving from the application’ of the EU
Treaties to be agreed under a lighter procedure laid down in Article 7(3) TEU (qualified
majority in the Council is then required). Importantly, the Commission faced no legal
obligation to start with 7(1) TEU first, as Article 7(2) TEU – unanimous finding by the
European Council of the existence of the breach of values can unquestionably serve as the
entry point into the palette of what Article 7 TEU has to offer.
4. Will the triggering of Article 7(1) make a difference?
While we welcome the Commission’s decision to submit a reasoned proposal to the Council
having rightly concluded that there is a ‘clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of
Poland of the rule of law referred to in Article 2 TEU’ (para 127 of the reasoned proposal),
the triggering of this provision is overdue and, as one of us previously argued in October
2016, the right time to have done so was November 2016 before the all too predictable
unconstitutional capture of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal which happened at the end of
December 2016. The continuing and misplaced faith in ‘dialogue’ with a government so
clearly following Orbán’s autocratic blueprint has meant that the Polish ruling party was
able to undermine if not annihilate virtually all checks and balances one year before the
Commission moved to act, fulfilling its duty as the guardian of the Treaties.
The Commission may also be criticised for not triggering much earlier on Article 7(1)
against ‘both Poland and Hungary even apart from the instrumental reason that Article 7
TEU is foiled by two rogue states acting in concert if sanctions are attempted against them
one at a time’. In this respect, sceptics may argue that the triggering of Article 7 is bound to
fail as ultimately, ‘rogue countries’ may just protect one another should the Commission (or
one third of the Member States) decide to activate the sanctioning mechanism laid down in
this provision. While this is a minority view we share the argument first defended by one of
the present authors that in a situation where ‘Article 7(1) is invoked against both Hungary
and Poland at the same time, neither should be able to vote if Article 7(2) … is invoked
against either one’. We believe this interpretation can be justified on the basis of the effet
utile doctrine – a corollary to the teleological method of interpretation and which may be
described as a ‘form of interpretation of treaties and other instruments derived from French
administrative law which looks to the object and purpose of a treaty, as well as the context,
to make the treaty more effective’ (Encyclopaedic Dictionnary of International Law).
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The recent ruling of the Court of Justice in the Białowieża Forest infringement case may be
said to further strengthen Professor Scheppele’s claim. Indeed, in the absence of any
explicit reference to the eventual imposition of financial sanctions in the context of interim
relief rulings under Article 279 TFEU (for further analysis see Professor Sarmiento’s post
here), the Court, correctly in our view, by reference to Article 260 TFEU but also and
significantly by reference to the effective application of EU Law in the name of the principle
of the rule of law enshrined in Article 2 TEU:
The purpose of seeking to ensure that a Member State complies with interim measures
adopted by the Court hearing an application for such measures by providing for the imposition
of a periodic penalty payment in the event of non-compliance with those measures is to
guarantee the effective application of EU law, such application being an essential component
of the rule of law, a value enshrined in Article 2 TEU and on which the European Union is
founded.
Be that as it may, we also agree with Frans Timmermans when he said that ‘the facts leave
[the Commission] no choice’ but to initiate Article 7. As two of the present authors
previously wrote, it was more than time ‘to oblige national governments to face up to their
own responsibilities to keep European values at the centre of the Treaties’. The remaining
question, of course, is why this argument has been used in the context of 7(1) as opposed
of 7(2) given that the situation on the ground in Poland is clearly – in the view of the
Commission, the Venice Commission and countless other actors – one of clear and
persistent breach of values, as opposed to a threat thereof.
The explanation might lie beyond the simple difficulty of the procedural requirements
related to the sanctioning stage. Even though Article 7(1) is merely a warning without any
direct sanctions, the indirect effects of triggering Article 7(1) should not be underestimated.
To name but a few possible knock-on effects (further analysis and references here), the
activation of Article 7(1) coupled with the forthcoming total subjugation of the Polish courts
to the whims and interests of the Polish ruling party may lead the Court of Justice to set
aside the principle of mutual trust and/or stop recognising Polish courts as courts within the
meaning of EU Law (the ongoing and arguably insufficiently noticed infringement procedure
concerning the Polish Law on the Ordinary Courts will require the Court of Justice to
address, for the first time as far as we know, the independence of the whole judiciary of a
Member State). This could then leave the European Commission no choice but to suspend
EU funding to Poland, an option which according to Israel Butler is in any event already
available to the Commission (on this issue see also a recent report ‘Can EU funds promote
the rule of law in Europe?’).
A functioning judicial system is not only necessary to maintain a constitutional government;
it is also necessary to maintain a market economy. The impact on commercial arbitration
involving Polish companies if not the financial markets may also in time be too significant to
be comfortably ignored by Polish authorities. And while it was recently noted by Capital
Economics that the experience of Hungary suggests that ‘recurrent run-ins’ with the EU ‘do
not tend to have much impact on growth in the short-run’, ‘the potential impact on Poland’s
growth prospects over the medium-term’ might eventually become significant for an
economy which is not only highly dependent on EU funding but also FDI.
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Looking beyond the law and economics of Article 7, it is difficult to predict how the politics
of Article 7 may play out. We do not believe the Austrian precedent means that a
nationalistic backlash is necessarily bound to materialise and undermine the Commission’s
attempts to stop Poland’s descent into authoritarianism. In the case of Austria in 2000, a
number of EU countries overreacted as diplomatic sanctions were adopted before any
evidence of any systemic attempts to undermine principles such as the rule of law or
respect for human rights. And while the freezing of bilateral relations may have led to a rise
in nationalist sentiments in Austria, which was unsurprising considering that diplomatic
sanctions were adopted before a breach of Article 2 values in the country could be
documented, using the ‘Austrian precedent’ to justify inaction against both Poland and
Hungary makes no (legal) sense. In these two countries, we have a sustained track record
and ample evidence of actual, repeated and systemic rule of law violations in these two
countries starting in 2011 in the case of Hungary and starting in 2015 in the case of Poland.
The Commission, as Guardian of the Treaties, should not, in any event, only seek to
uphold the rule of law when facing an easy political constellation. All EU institutions but
also national governments should carefully assess the long term cost of appeasement or
inaction  and stop prioritising how autocratic or nativist forces may reach to prioritise
instead the broader interests of EU citizens, whose rights and obligations can now
unfortunately ‘be defined, in part, by ‘illiberal regimes’ via their participation to the EU’s
decision making processes’. The European Parliament did point out in December 2015 that
Hungary was ‘a test for the EU to prove its capacity and political willingness to react to
threats and breaches of its own founding values by a Member State’ and that ‘the inaction
of the EU may have contributed to … the rule of law being undermined’ elsewhere in the
EU. The Union’s passivity regarding Orbán’s ‘mafia state’ (in large part due to the
leadership of the European People’s Party putting time and time again short term political
considerations over the principles this party supposedly stands for) has no doubt
emboldened Poland’s ruling party to not even bother playing to the gallery while they
relentlessly destroy all rule of law institutions in plain sight and prepare the grounds for the
de facto establishment of a one-party state.
To end however on an optimistic note, one may refer to the seemingly beneficial political
knock-on effects of the Commission’s decision to initiate Article 7(1) in Romania, a country
where the rule of situation has been seriously deteriorating these past few months despite
the country having been subject to a special rule of law mechanism since 2007… With
reference to the Commission’s decision, the Romanian President has warned the country’s
ruling coalition that the country could be next should the ruling coalition push ahead with its
controversial changes to Romania’s legal system.
5. Next steps
The Commission’s Article 7(1) proposal was issued at the same time as the Commission’s
fourth rule of law recommendation. This recommendation gives Poland three months to
solve the problems identified in the Recommendation. This suggests that the Council will
not seek to organise the hearing of Poland and obtain the consent of the European
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Parliament until at least the end of March 2018. There are no signs yet that the Polish
government tends to engage in good faith and cooperate by that time. On this basis one
could foresee the following schedule for playing out the next stages of the Article 7 process:
(i) The Council would organise a hearing following the procedure identified in of Article 7(1)
TEU in April/May 2018;
(ii) Consent of the Parliament would then be sought in May/June 2018 (Article 354 TFEU
provides that the European Parliament shall act by a two-thirds majority of votes cast,
representing the majority of its component Members);
(iii) Assuming this consent is given the Council may then seek to adopt in June/July a
decision by a four-fifths majority (22 of 27 Members of the Council will have to agree with
Poland obviously precluded from taking part in this vote) in order to formally determine the
existence of ‘a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law’
(see Article 1 of the Commission’s reasoned proposal for a Council decision under Article
7(1) regarding the rule of law in Poland);
(iv) Assuming this decision is adopted (at this stage it remains unclear whether 22 of 27
Members of the Council stand ready to de facto censure the Polish ruling party), the
Council would then most likely simultaneously address recommendations to Poland acting
in accordance with the same voting procedure (the post-Lisbon text of Article 7(1) provides
that the Council may address recommendations to Poland before making such a
determination but the Commission’s reasoned proposal suggests that a single decision
could be adopted by the Council to simultaneously determine the existence of a clear risk
of a serious breach of the rule of law and adopt recommendations);
(v) Should Poland fail to comply with the Council’s recommendations within the foreseen
three-month deadline post the adoption of the Council’s Article 7(1) decision, one would
then expect this problem to be escalated to the European Council by the end of December
2018, but this would not be an automatic consequence of Poland’s failure to comply with
any eventual Article 7(1) decision by the Council.
Interestingly, it is also expected that the European Parliament will organise a plenary vote
on whether to initiate Article 7(1) proceedings against Hungary in September 2018, in which
case by the time the European Council might have to unanimously determine the existence
of a serious breach, we could have both Kaczyński’s Poland and Orbán’s Hungary subject
to Article 7 proceedings in which case, if one agrees with our effet utile reading of Article 7,
both should lose their right to vote to protect one another in this context. It would be indeed
quite an absurd construction of Article 7 if its deterrent effect simply disappeared when one
rogue member state was joined by a second.
Looking beyond Article 7 and as previously noted, we can only but deplore the EU’s failure
to prevent and sanction rule of law backsliding from emerging first in Hungary before
spreading to Poland. Faced with two member states that are violating European values, the
most effective way to deal with the issue may be to cut off EU funding. We worry that this,
too, is unlikely to happen in the absence of a ‘nuclear’ ruling by the Court of Justice,
meaning a ruling leading to the suspension of the principle of mutual trust where Poland is
concerned (further analysis here). The impact of bilateral diplomatic pressure if not the
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freezing of diplomatic relations would also most likely be effective but the need for the
EU27 to remain united in the context of the Brexit negotiations means that this option is off
the table.
Thinking longer-term, multi-speed Europe may well solve not only the uneven willingness of
states to move toward closer cooperation, but may also provide the perfect opportunity to
leave behind states that are unwilling to fully adhere to basic principles. If the EU proves
unable to rein in autocrats any other way, the incorporation of conditionality techniques into
policing each of the integration’s concentric circles is likely to become a necessary element
of the edifice. As the speed and vectors of integration evolve, Poland and the likes of
Poland could find themselves outside the scope of meaningful activity – behind the door of
the integration’s kitchen. With the growing pressure on the Union’s values from a number of
countries, this may be the most realistic way forward to preserve the EU as a union of value
in the long run, while also being sufficiently open towards the states hijacked by autocratic
and plutocratic forces.
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